After four Premier League games, Tottenham sit 19th in the league's xG table with 3.45. That's not a slump, and it's not bad luck. That's a structural signal.
The problem crystallised most clearly in the recent defeats to Newcastle and Liverpool. In both matches — Newcastle a league fixture where Spurs conceded twice in the second half (62', 72'), and Liverpool's 3-1 Carabao Cup defeat at Anfield — the same pattern emerged: a period of purposeful buildup and promising movement in tight spaces, then a collapse where the shape stretched, the press lost its cohesion, and the opposition found space that hadn't been there before. What makes the xG number so damning is that it means Spurs aren't just losing matches in terms of result — they're losing them in terms of genuine danger created. Roughly 0.86 expected goals per game across four matches is serious underperformance for a side being built to dominate possession and create high-quality chances.
The question worth asking isn't 'who is failing?' It's 'where is the system breaking down, and why?'
Start with the press. De Zerbi's system at Brighton and Marseille was built on aggressive, coordinated pressing that forces turnovers in advanced positions — the kind that immediately converts defensive actions into attacking ones. At Spurs, the press is there in the first 20 or 25 minutes. The triggers are recognisable, the shape is right, and when it clicks, the team looks genuinely threatening. But sustaining that intensity for 90 minutes requires an automatic, drilled fluency that only comes with time — players knowing without thinking which runs to make, when to press and when to hold, how the shape shifts when the ball moves. This squad hasn't had that time yet. De Zerbi was appointed in late March, had a summer with a £229m rebuild to integrate, and is now asking players who have only had weeks of pre-season together to execute one of the most cognitively demanding styles in the game.
Sandro Tonali is the clearest example of a player who should be central to how this works and hasn't quite locked in yet. The £92.5m signing from Newcastle is the intended midfield anchor — the player who sets the tempo, shields the backline when Spurs are out of possession, and provides the platform for the press to function. At Newcastle under Eddie Howe, Tonali had a very different job: more direct, less positionally demanding in terms of rotational movement. What De Zerbi asks of a deep midfielder is closer to what you'd see from a Sassuolo or Brighton playmaker — constantly adjusting position relative to the ball and the press, reading second-phase play before it happens. Tonali has the technical quality to do it. He doesn't yet have the automatic understanding of De Zerbi's system to do it consistently for 90 minutes. When he drops out of position, the entire midfield block shifts and the press loses its shape, which is precisely when an organised side like Newcastle — or Saturday's Villa — find the pocket between the lines.
When the midfield block isn't functioning as a unit, even good defenders in high lines are exposed — and that's what the second-half collapses have consistently looked like.
Mateus Fernandes is the other piece of this that deserves closer attention. At 21, he was one of the most exciting players in the Premier League last season at West Ham, and there's genuine quality there — quick in tight spaces, comfortable carrying the ball under pressure. But there's a difference between being a technically gifted player and being one who instinctively understands positional play in a De Zerbi 4-2-3-1 or 4-3-3. The movement patterns De Zerbi demands — especially from the No.8 or second-striker role — require a specific kind of spatial awareness that is learned through repetition. Fernandes is still learning it. That's not a criticism of the signing; it's a timeline problem.
Jan Paul van Hecke is the one new signing who looks most immediately ready, which makes sense given he worked under De Zerbi at Brighton. He understands what it means to be a ball-playing centre-back in this system — when to step out and carry, when to hold the line, how the backline positions itself relative to the press. But even van Hecke can only do so much when the midfield block in front of him isn't functioning as a unit. Good defenders in high defensive lines need the press to work. When it doesn't, they're exposed.
Andy Robertson at left-back adds another layer. Robertson at his peak was one of the best attacking full-backs in Europe, but he's 32 and lost his Liverpool starting spot to Milos Kerkez. What De Zerbi asks of his full-backs is very specific — they invert, they tuck into midfield, they create numerical superiority in central areas. Robertson has the intelligence to do it, but he'll need time to find the automatic reads that make those movements feel natural rather than instructed.
Here's the reality: De Zerbi's system works, but it only works when every player in the shape knows their job without thinking. That level of fluency can't be rushed. Brighton took a full season to lock it in. Marseille had the benefit of recruiting specifically into that system and playing in a less competitive league. Spurs are trying to build a first-rate possession team on the fly, mid-season rebuild, against sides that know what they're doing already. The xG isn't low because the players aren't good enough. It's low because they're still learning the language De Zerbi speaks.
Against Villa on Saturday, expect the same first-half promise and the same second-half vulnerability. That's not a prediction of failure — it's a fixture of where this rebuild stands right now. The substance will come. But it'll only come when the shape becomes automatic.